We study the product design problem of a revenue-maximizing firm that serves a market where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their valuations and desire for a quality attribute, and are characterized by a perhaps novel model of customer choice behavior. Specifically, instead of...

We study the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in presence of strategic customers that differ in their valuations and risk preferences. We show that this problem can be formulated as a static mechanism design problem, which is more amenable to analysis. We highlight several structural...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

Problem Definition: Motivated by ride-hailing platforms such as Uber, Lyft and Didi, we study the problem of matching riders with self-interested drivers over a spatial network. We focus on the performance impact of two operational platform controls---demand-side admission control and...

We consider a liquidation problem in which a risk-averse trader tries to liquidate a fixed quantity of an asset in the presence of market impact and random price fluctuations. When deciding the liquidation strategy, the trader encounters a trade-off between the transaction costs incurred due to...

Product choice when consumers engage in social learning has significant implications on learning outcomes and on the information accumulation rate. In many practical settings, consumers can choose which product to buy, if any, among several possible alternatives. The quality of these products...

We study an aggregated marketplace where potential buyers arrive and submit requests-for-quotes (RFQs). There are n independent suppliers modeled as M/GI/1 queues that compete for these requests. Each supplier submits a bid that comprises of a fixed price and a dynamic target leadtime, and the...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

We model an electronic limit order book as a multi-class queueing system under fluid dynamics, and formulate and solve a problem of limit and market order placement to optimally buy a block of shares over a short, predetermined time horizon. Using the structure of the optimal execution policy,...