We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we...

We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...

In a controlled field experiment, we examine pairs of auctions for identical items under different conditions. We find that auction design features that are under the control of the auctioneer - including information transparency, number of simultaneous auctions, and the degree of overlap...

Price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price. Much of this price dispersion appears to be due to lack of switching by bidders between auctions, which in turn could be due to inertia related to search...

The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in simultaneous winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and non-charity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid, with voluntary payment compliance from losing...

In a controlled field experiment, we examine pairs of auctions for identical items under different conditions. We find that auction design features that are under the control of the auctioneer — including information transparency, number of simultaneous auctions, and the degree of overlap...

We study cause-related auctions where a percentage of the dynamically determined purchase price of an item is donated to charity. Little is known about the effectiveness of such auctions. Charitable bidders who value donations to charity have an incentive to bid more aggressively in such...

We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we...