Internet auctions are common in nearly all consumer categories. Hence, it is not surprising that a great deal of research has emerged on the topic in recent years. New design and format considerations and a wealth of available data from various platforms provide new questions and promising...

The purpose of this study is to determine how self-driven (intrinsic motivators) and monetary incentives (extrinsic motivators) are mediated by effort to affect fundraising outcomes. This integration sheds light on crowding out between the two types of incentives as well the drivers of...

In a controlled field experiment, we examine pairs of auctions for identical items under different conditions. We find that auction design features that are under the control of the auctioneer - including information transparency, number of simultaneous auctions, and the degree of overlap...

The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in simultaneous winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and non-charity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid, with voluntary payment compliance from losing...

In a controlled field experiment, we examine pairs of auctions for identical items under different conditions. We find that auction design features that are under the control of the auctioneer — including information transparency, number of simultaneous auctions, and the degree of overlap...

We study cause-related auctions where a percentage of the dynamically determined purchase price of an item is donated to charity. Little is known about the effectiveness of such auctions. Charitable bidders who value donations to charity have an incentive to bid more aggressively in such...

One view regarding auction duration suggests that longer auctions would result in more bidders and more bids, which in turn would result in higher prices. An opposing view is that shorter auctions might appeal to impatient bidders, or alternatively that shorter duration might lead to more...

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we...

We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...

We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...