We study a model in which managers' disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to...

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps...

Existing literature assumes that the order and timing of analysts' earnings forecasts are determined exogenously. However, analysts choose when to issue their forecasts. This study develops a model that endogenizes the timing decision of analysts and analyzes their equilibrium timing strategies....

When two random variables are both additive or multiplicative, the effect of the way one quot;slicesquot; the available period to subperiods (time intervals) is well documented in the literature. In this paper, we investigate the time interval effect when one of the variables is additive and one...

We analyze a model in which information may be voluntarily disclosed by a firm and/or by a third party, e.g., financial analysts. Due to its strategic nature, corporate voluntary disclosure is qualitatively different from third-party disclosure. Greater analyst coverage crowds out (crowds in)...

This study models the interaction between a sell-side analyst and risk-averse investors. It derives an analyst's optimal earnings forecast and investors' optimal trading decisions in a setting where the analyst's payoff depends on the trading volume the forecast generates as well as on the...

We present a rational model of earnings management. An informed manager, whose compensation is linked to the stock price, trades off the benefit of boosting the stock price by inflating the reported earnings against the costs of such manipulation. The investors rationally interpret his actions...

Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debtcovenant violations. We study how a firm's ability to manipulate reports affects the terms ofits debt contracts and the resulting investment and manipulation decisions that the firm implements.Our model...

Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multi-firm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequential reporting, where firms aim to maximize...