This paper deals with the impact of the arrival of public information on the intraday trading of highly liquid stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse.

A large part of the current debate on US stock price behaviorconcentrates on the question of whether stock prices are driven byfundamentals or by non-fundamental factors(...)

This paper examines necessary conditions for a demand for new information to exist. In this one-period model, investors are homogeneous, have logarithmic utility, and must decide on information acquisition before trading starts, and without knowing what other investors will do. We examine the...

A costless, fully revealing signalling equilibrium is derived from two easily understandable conditions. The outsidet-protection condition states that the outsiders relate the price which they offer to pay for a security inversely to the supply of this security which they interpret as a quality...

The incentive to trade implies that all investors in the market choose to be informed although the whole of them cannot profit from the information signal. This result is due to an insurance property of information.

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of...

We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with...