Divide the decisionmaker's future into: (i) a pre-outcome period (lasting from the decision until the outcome of that decision is known), and (ii) a sequel post-outcome period (beginning when the outcome becomes known). Anticipated emotions in both periods may influence the decision, in...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a...

We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its...

Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the...

A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Interaction neighborhood to obtain their payoff. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neighbors in another neighborhood- the Propagation...

Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a...

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

The information that is used to create a numerical response is typically diffuse, and cannot be described by a distribution. A criterion to describe the information is its range of reasonable alternatives, corresponding to the worst case-best case analysis of practitioners in decision situations...

Starting point of the theory of prominence is the observation that the selection of a numerical response is performed by a process of stepwise refinement of a reasonable answer until the available information does not permit a further specification. The procedure starts with a sufficiently high...