The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that peoples belief over uncertainevents might not be representable by subjective probability. We relate this paradox to other commonly observed anomalies, suchas a rejection of the backward induction prediction in the one-shot Ultimatum Game. We argue that the...

The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's belief over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We argue that Uncertainty Aversion may be viewed as a case of "Rule Rationality''. This paradigm claims that people's decision making has evolved to simple rules...

We evaluate Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012) data on choices made from Convex Time Budgets (CTB) for external consistency with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) relative to the pairwise choice benchmark, and for internal consistency with respect to demand, wealth and impatience...

We demonstrate how the standard usage of the random incentive system in ambiguity experiments is not incentive compatible if the decision maker is ambiguity averse. We propose a slight modification of the procedure in which the randomization takes place before decisions are made and the state is...

Halevy (2008) establishes a relation between non-standard behaviors in the domains of risk and time. A decision maker who believes that only present consumption is certain while any future consumption is uncertain exhibits diminishing impatience if and only if her preferences on the risk domain...

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic ``preference reversals'' between sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically-motivated design permits separate identification of time-consistent, stationary and time-invariant...

Decision makers tend to exhibit a higher degree of impatience when considering a delay to an immediate reward than when contemplating an identical delay to an equal future reward. This work argues that diminishing impatience originates from the distinction between the certain present and the...

We study choice between bets on the colors of two balls, where one ball is drawn from each of two urns. Though you are told the same about each urn, you are told very little, so that you are not given any reason to be certain that the compositions are identical. We identify choices that reveal...

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic ``preference reversals'' between sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically-motivated design permits separate identification of time-consistent, stationary and time-invariant...