This paper develops a simple dynamic framework of holdout in land acquisition (both with and without political intervention), where holdout arises because of the landowners' inability to manage large sums of money (and consequent lack of inter-temporal consumption smoothing in case of sale). We...

In this paper we analyze the effect of income inequality on market outcome and hence the welfare of the consumer in the industry which is both horizontally and vertically differentiated. The idea is that any income distribution over the spatial horizon is reflected in the demand structure and...

We develop a tractable model of competition among motivated MFIs. We find that equilibria may or may not involve double-dipping (and consequently default), with there being double-dipping whenever the MFIs are very profit-oriented. Moreover, in an equilibrium with double-dipping, borrowers who...

In a scenario where terrorist organizations, based in an LDC, target a rich nation, we examine a joint, multi-pronged and dynamic counter-terror strategy and the role that developmental aid plays in its success. We show that aid-tying leads to a fruitful virtuous cycle whereby joint...

We examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional per unit cost of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash...

We examine group-lending under sequential financing. In a model with moral hazard, social capital and endogenous group formation, we identify conditions such that sequential financing with joint liability leads to positive assortative matching between borrowers with and without social capital...

This paper examines a marriage market with externality. We first develop an appropriate notion of stability for this market, called E-stability. We provide an example to show that an E-stable outcome need not exist. We then derive conditions under which an E-stable outcome exists.

For a large class of demand and cost functions, we characterize the limit equilibrium set under Bertrand oligopoly when entry is exogenous. Unless average cost is constant, we find that the folk theorem of perfect competition necessarily fails. We also relate our results to those in Novshek and...

We examine a model of price competition where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity, and are free to supply less than the quantity demanded. We demonstrate that if the tie-breaking rule is `non-manipulable', then, for a large class of rationing rules, there is a unique...

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price...