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processes and the inherent variability of competitors' effort choices introduce uncertainty to tournament settings with respect … uncertainty leads to more excess of effort if compared to optimality (Avrahami et al., 2007). This paper experimentally … responses, and mainly overestimate their opponents. Leveling uncertainty influences both overshooting and the precision of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263891
depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty … in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen and … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263840
uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric … or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090471
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112121
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111204
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326344
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326509
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328332
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343280
In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, ob Vorstandsabfindungen von börsennotierten Unternehmen durch die Empfehlung 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Satz 1 des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex in ihrer Höhe begrenzt werden. Die Analyse umfangreicher empirischer Daten zu Entsprechenserklärungen aller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012008612