Risky products cause two types of costs for society; the accident costs and the insurance costs. Liability rules allocate these costs between the parties involved. The expansion in the scope of product liability over the past thirty years has increased the cost of third-party liability...

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or 'vigilant' parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

We provide an extensive and general investigation of the effects on industryperformance - profits, social welfare and price-cost margins - of exogenously changing the number of firms in Cournot markets. This includes an in-depth exploration of the well-known trade-off between competition and...

We characterize the sharing rule that achieves efficiency in a contribution mechanism when agents are heterogeneous. This rule is not the one that was found by Sen when agents are identical. We also show that for a large class of sharing rules if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations,...

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...