In this paper, we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers’ skills. We show that informational differences across jobs give rise to experimentation in that workers may be willing to sacrifice current period output in order to take...

We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of producing a high-quality good by providing costly effort. We demonstrate that, when the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost...

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic model of labor supply, occupational sorting, human capital accumulation and discrimination to explain the narrowing gender earnings gap from 1968 to 1993. The paper proves the model is identified and develops a three-step estimation technique....

This paper explores the estimation of a class of life-cycle discrete choice dynastic models. It provides a new representation of the value function for these class of models. It compare a multistage conditional choice probability (CCP) estimator based on the new value function representation...

We model the interaction between product market competition and internal governance at firms. Competition makes it more difficult to infer a manager's action given the realized output, thus increasing the cost of inducing effort. An exogenous change in the incentive to shirk increases managerial...

This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of...