We develop a general equilibrium model of trade between identical countries. The model is similar to a 2x2x2 Heckser-Ohlin model, but the factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, are endogenously determined from human capital investments by the workers. Firms are only able to observe...

We consider a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated differently in equilibrium due to informational externalities. Unlike earlier models of statistical discrimination, group inequalities may arise even if the...

We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages, where discrimination between ex ante identical groups is sustainable in equilibrium. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may "fail" in the sense that there still may be equilibria where...

We develop a general equilibrium model of trade with endogenous human capital acquisition in job specific skills and imperfectly observable skills. We show that even if there are no ex-ante fundamental differences between countries there may be equilibria under international trade with...

We consider a generic environment with (potentially) multiple equilibria and analyze conditions for identification of the structural parameters. We then study conditions that allow for the estimation of both the structural parameters and the “selected equilibriumâ€. We focus on a...

This book presents a set of studies on contemporary discrimination in Latin America that takes advantage of these new tools by focusing on social interactions that range from cooperation, group formation, and the impact of migration in poor families to specific markets such as housing and labor....

This book presents a set of studies on contemporary discrimination in Latin America that takes advantage of these new tools by focusing on social interactions that range from cooperation, group formation, and the impact of migration in poor families to specific markets such as housing and labor....

This paper provides a simple explanation for why some minority groups are economically successful, despite being subject to government-mandated discriminatory policies. We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly observable skills that are important...

In the first chapter, Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation, I analyze a widely used model of endogenous policy determination. The main question is if the stationary equilibrium, a popular equilibrium selection in applied work, can be rationalized as approximating the unique backwards...