The 1990s will be the first decade after the revolutionary upheavals in the world economic and political system following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Democracy has spread into areas which were earlier citadels of authoritarianism. For the first time 'peace'...

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same...

This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping behavior is affected by the opportunities that a counterpart foregoes by relying on the promise. We present two motivational mechanisms that could drive such an effect. One is that people dislike causing harm through a...

This paper examines the proposition that "poverty is a violation of human rights". The author disuses the possibility of this proposition to be implementable in real case senarios and in polcies,

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same...

Using an experimental trust game, we investigate whether guilt-aversion motivates individuals to keep their promise. In our modified trust game, we allow the trustor to purchase insurance in case of a non-performance by the trustee. In our design, the purchase of insurance signals lower...

The central question this paper explores is “Do people keep their promise to avoid expectation-based guilt?” Using a novel design wherein we endogenously vary the promisor's expectation of what the promisee expects from him, we find that promisors are heterogeneous in their reasons for...

This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping behavior is affected by the opportunities that a counterpart foregoes by relying on the promise. We present two motivational mechanisms that could drive such an effect. One is that people dislike causing harm through a...

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. While teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate...