Fix finite pure strategy sets S1, . . ., Sn, and let S = S1 x . . .x Sn. In our model of a random game the agents' payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent's payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in IRS. For given nonempty T1 c S1, . . ., Tn c Sn we give a computationally...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal; and...

Levy (2013) presents examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria. The second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect. In addition to describing the details of this error, this note presents a new example by the first named author...

The effect of perturbing a parameter—comparative statics—is, of course, a familiar and important issue in economic analysis. Perfection of a single Nash equilibrium (Selten (1975)) is defined by requiring that at least some perturbations in a given class give rise to perturbed...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...