We introduce a new class of quot;increasing elasticity of substitutionquot; (IES) preferences to model product differentiation. In a monopolistic competition setting a la Dixit - Stiglitz (1977) we find that, even under constant returns to scale and complete information, a rise in the number of...

We analize a market in the process of liberalization. Consumers are biased in favor of the incumbent firm and we assume that they can discover the true value of new suppliers only by switching. In an infinitely-repeated game setting with Bertrand competition, we first show that efficient entry...

We analize a market in the process of liberalization. Consumers are biased in favor of the incumbent firm and we assume that they can discover the true value of new suppliers only by switching. In an infinitely repeated game setting with Bertrand competition, we first show that efficient entry...

The increase in distributed generation and the increasingly pro-active role of mass consumers demand “smart” distribution networks. To this aim, regulation too must innovate, in order to promote innovative and additional infrastructural investments.This paper develops, first, a...

In this paper we discuss the EU policy on electricity markets integration by reviewing the experience of the Electricity Regional Initiatives. The regional approach to market integration delivered important results in areas such as coordination among national transmission system operators,...

In the 90s, when the liberalization of Italian energy markets started, short-term efficiency issues were driving the economic debate. Over time, the focus of energy policies has progressively shifted towards a multilayered set of interrelated long-term objectives, ranging from climate change, to...

According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private...

We study the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information and a reserve price, and compare it with that of standard auctions. The seller should set a reserve price even when she faces incomplete information. In the latter setting, ex-ante asymmetry among bidders appears necessary...

We study a class of symmetric, quasi-homothetic preferences that result in demands logarithmic in own prices when these have a negligible impact on aggregate price indices (as in monopolistic competition models). Thus marginal revenues are computationally friendly, and decreasing whenever...