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Fudenberg et Kreps (1993), Young (1993), et Sela et Herreiner (1999) ont souligné l'insuffisance du critère de convergence en croyances du processus de Fictitious Play dans un cadre d'apprentissage des équilibres de Nash. En conséquence, nous choisissons d'étudier la convergence en...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985385
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We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. When each player has two strategies and the base game is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005818473
A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent's investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369430
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753138
A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752433
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761373
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791491