In this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market. We characterize equilibrium, derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions, and characterize the set of wage distributions that can...

In this paper we present and estimate a synthesis of previous equilibrium search models: allowing for continuous distributions of workers opportunity costs of employment, as well as firms’ productivities. The model allows for on-the-job search, and we assume that job offer arrival rates for...

In this paper we theoretically and empirically analyze equilibrium search models of the labor market. The Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model is generalized by allowing for continuous distributions of firm productivity types within a given labor market. We characterize equilibrium and...

<p>We analyze the identification and estimation of parameters β satisfying the incomplete linear moment restrictions E(z ^T(x β−y)) = E(z^Tu(z)) where z is a set of instruments and u(z) an unknown bounded scalar function. We first provide empirically relevant examples of such a set-up. Second, we...</p>

In this paper, we develop moment-based tests for parametric discrete distributions. Momentbased test techniques are attractive as they provide easy-to-implement test statistics. We propose a general transformation that makes the moments of interest insensitive to the parameter estimation...

In this paper, we develop moment-based tests for parametric discrete distributions. Momentbased test techniques are attractive as they provide easy-to-implement test statistics. We propose a general transformation that makes the moments of interest insensitive to the parameter estimation...

We analyze the identification and estimation of parameters β satisfying the incomplete linear moment restrictions E(zT (xβ−y)) = E(zT u(z)) where z is a set of instruments and u(z) an unknown bounded scalar function. We first provide empirically relevant examples of such a set-up. Second, we...

We develop a two-stage game in which competing airlines first choose the networks of markets to serve in the first stage before competing in price in the second stage. Spillovers in entry decisions across markets are allowed, which accrue on the demand, marginal cost, and fixed cost sides. We...