committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage …, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to …, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying …

can mitigate time inconsistency by introducing a status quo bias. When voting institutions (ie. the committee`s … committee to make decisions through voting is that a commitment device can be created out of it, without totally renouncing … flexibility to respond to unexpected contingenices. Appropriate voting procedures and a well chosen supermajority rule can make a …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …