We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely not only to force the main...

We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution (FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization initially,...

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium...

This paper explores a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist—entrepreneur relationship where a manager provides unobservable effort while a venture capitalist (VC) both supplies unobservable effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public...

In this paper, we explore a dynamic theory of investment and costly managerial turnover given agency conflicts between the firm manager and investors. We incorporate the possibility of the successive replacement of managers until the firm is finally liquidated, and develop a continuous-time...

Given an owner's noncommitment timing strategy and a manager's hidden action, we consider how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is designed and how the corresponding timing decisions to launch the project and replace the manager are determined. Using a real options approach, we...

One of the challenges of modern banks is providing uninsured wholesale depositors with a safe haven. We model banks deciding their own capital and liquidity levels in a forwardlooking manner to absorb an exogenous shock to their investment through interbank trading. A regulatory framework...

Banking regulations recognize subordinated debt as capital, mainly because its subordination in payment likely incentivizes investors to determine the interest rate to discipline their bank against taking risk. We challenge the disciplinary view by introducing hybrid-natured investors in...

The recent empirical studies suggest that a change in the policy interest rate has a significant impact on the liquidity management of the banks.Focusing on the role of the interbank market in mitigating a trade-off associated with the cost of precautionary hoarding of liquidity, this paper...