The yuan-dollar returns prior to the 2005 revaluation show a Sierpinski triangle in an iterated function system clumpiness test. Yet the fractal vanishes after the revaluation. The Sierpinski commonly emerges in the chaos game, where randomness coexists with deterministic rules [2, 3]. Here it...

Prospect theory [4] of risky choices has been extended to encompass intertemporal choices [6]. Presentation of intertemporal prospect theory suffers from minor mistakes, however [2]. To clarify the theory we restate it and show further mistakes in current presentations ([6], [2]) of value and...

Investors seem to hold on to their losing stocks to a greater extent than they hold on to their winning stocks. This well-document behavioral regularity is termed disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). We set an experiment to replicate results from a previous study of the disposition...

This paper provides estimates of the elasticities of demand for the Brazilian basic plan of local fixed telephony using a cointegration model. We find a long-run price elasticity of –0.24, and an income elasticity of 0.18. These figures are line with other countries’ estimates.

Because sports are stylized combat, sports may follow power laws similar to those found for wars, individual clashes, and acts of terrorism. We show this fact for football (soccer) by adjusting power laws that show a close relationship between rank and points won by the clubs participating in...

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

We present an international trade model with multiproduct firms. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the trade-off within firms between managing a large portfolio of products and producing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the...

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts...

We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...

We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...