we study voluntary contributions games.  We identify two robust features of the players' learning dynamics: search …Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players … are in the dark about others' actions and the payoff structure.  This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box …

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a … competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In …

We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players … information. …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … equilibrium under a wide class of learning processes. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth … strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but in one game the NE is stable …

games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects … played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 ´ 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The … equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We …

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response … set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest …). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given. …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP …

This paper considers a version of Bush and Mosteller's stochastic learning theory in the context of games. We compare … this model of learning to a model of biological evolution. The purpose is to investigate analogies between learning and … replicator process. We give conditions under which the same is true for the learning model. For the case that these conditions do …

Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly … randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the …