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When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471182
In 1992, turnover on the New York Stock Exchange was 48 percent. While there is no convincing theoretical prediction for assessing this number, observers may have the view that turnover is very high. The increase in turnover has been accompanied by a rise in institutional ownership. A regression...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794376
We determine firms' equity ownership structures and provide a theory of hostile takeovers by distinguishing the roles of two types of blockholders: rich investors and institutional investors. We also distinguish the roles of two types of stock markets: the block market and the market with small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794400
Who should control the firm? What should be the firm's objective function? If contracts are incomplete, then the group of input providers that most needs their interests protected should be allocated control rights to the firm. Existing theories argue that the suppliers of capital are most in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794476
The authors focus on the persistence of bank unprofitability during the 1980s. A large literature in banking, following Merton (1977), concentrates on the incentives of shareholders to maximize the value of the (fixed rate) deposit insurance subsidy provided by the government by taking on risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005742668
In the first chapter of my dissertation I study the costs and benefits of resource allocation by firms and by markets. When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are now allocated by managerial authority. We explore the choice of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009439104
This paper develops a theory of board power when the board of directors collects private information about the CEOs ability to make value-increasing investments. When CEO ability is unknown ex-ante, we show that board power can be helpful in inducing information production by the board and in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066393
Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contracts and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067541