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Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2002

Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262698

Taxation, Social Protection, and Governance Decentralization

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2017

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government's taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011786998

Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Cusack, Thomas R.; Iversen, Torben; Soskice, David - 2007

Die gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307104

Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Cusack, Thomas R.; Iversen, Torben; Soskice, David - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367956

Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762207

Government and cities : contests and the decentralization of decision making

Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2002

Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412469

Getting it right : communication, voting, and collective truth finding

Burdea, Valeria; Woon, Jonathan - 2023

We conduct an experiment in which groups are tasked with evaluating the truth of a set of politically relevant facts and statements, and we investigate whether communication improves information aggregation and the accuracy of group decisions. Our findings suggest that the effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495051

Terrorism and voting : the rise of right-wing populism in Germany

Sabet, Navid; Liebald, Marius; Friebel, Guido - 2023

Can right-wing terrorism increase support for far-right populist parties, and if so, why? Exploiting quasi-random variation between successful and failed attacks across German municipalities, we find that successful attacks lead to significant increases in the vote share for the right-wing,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014364725

Biased forecasts and voting : the Brexit referendum case

Bizzotto, Jacopo; Cipullo, Davide; Reslow, André - 2024 - This version: July 1, 2024

This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014583811

Who will vote quadratically? : voter turnout and votes cast under quadratic voting

Kaplow, Louis; Kominers, Scott Duke - 2016

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core …, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few … that require a different research agenda to bring into focus. Some of our analysis also has implications for voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578439