We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do...

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations...

We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies...

In many economies, there is substantial economic activity in the informal labor market, beyond the reach of government policy. Labor market policies, which by definition apply only to the formal-sector can have important spillover effects on the informal sector. The relative sizes of the...

We give an expression for the expected number of matches between unemployed workers and vacancies when each worker makes a = 2 applications, correcting Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2003). We also show that the limiting matching probability given in our earlier note is correct for any finite a.

We use the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys from 1992-93 and 1997-98 to examine inequality between urban and rural areas in Vietnam. Real per capita household consumption expenditure (RPCE) is our measure of well being. We apply a quantile regression decomposition technique to analyze the...

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do...

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do...

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do single -...