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Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149
Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
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Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods
Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David G. - 2016
Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147951
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Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997
evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335048
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Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games … higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to … relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282088
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Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.
Wooders, M.; Selten, R.; Cartwright, E. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2001
We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747143
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Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1997
evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818398
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Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction
Benthem, Johan Van; Pacuit, Eric; Roy, Olivier - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 52-86
turn works out for games, drawing on some recent advances in the literature. Our key examples are the long-term dynamics of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838860
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Auctioning Public Goods to Groups of Agents
Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to each group, which is not commonly known. We investigate an auction mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065955
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Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods
ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008302
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Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents
ALBOTH, Dirk; LERNER, Anat; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043652