We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...

Although extrinsic and intrinsic motivation likely jointly explain the effort of many agents engaged in public service delivery, canonical models of incentives in firms focus on the former. In the context of a rural health worker program in India, I develop and test a novel mobile phone app...

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...

Early proponents of development administration advanced a paradigm based on a search for technically superior models, the study and acceptability of cross-cultural public management experiences, and the promotion of policy management styles and structures oriented to particular ideological...

We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinantsof the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the publicdecision maker (as in the case of bribery) whereas passive waste does not (asin the case of inefficiency due to red tape). To assess the...