[...]Although our analysis compares outcomes before and afterPRWORA, it should be made clear that because the formalstate plan for welfare reform did not take effect until 1999, weare not really evaluating welfare reform in New York City.Instead, our results primarily reflect the net effect of...

To assess the employment effects of labor costs it is crucial to have reliable estimates of thelabor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we estimate along run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct forendogeneity in the...

Labor market studies on the effects of minimum wages are typically confinedto the sector or worker group directly affected. We present a two-sector searchmodel in which one sector is more productive than the other one and thus,pays higher wages. In such a framework, setting a minimum wage in...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry inthe final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between thefirms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market alwaysincreases welfare. If the input market is moderately...

Armchair evidence shows that many industries are made of a few big commercial ormanufacturing firms, which are able to affect the market outcome, and of a myriad of smallfamily-run businesses with very few employees, each of which has a negligible impact on themarket. Examples can be found in...

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when R&D productivities are sufficiently low (high), and...

It is usually believed that innovation increases profits of the firms and alsosocial welfare. In a duopoly model with product innovation, we show that both thesebelieve may go wrong. We show that if the cost of innovation is not very large,prisoner’s dilemma occurs under product innovation,...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...