Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan may result either because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate more effort to learn how to perform their tasks better (effort effect). We...

Supervisory monitoring and monetary incentives are often used concurrently to mitigate agency conflicts. When an agent has to exert different types of effort for multi-dimensional tasks, little evidence exists on the interaction effect on an agent’s performance when both control mechanisms are...

We investigate optimal pricing and capacity planning decisions for product-line settings such as introducing a new product or dropping an existing one. We consider a two-product, two-period model with stochastic demands, where price and capacity decisions are made at the outset. Investment in...

This paper provides empirical evidence that industry-specific non-financial metrics, whose disclosure is mandated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for the ten largest U.S. airlines, have explanatory power for top executive pay-for-performance relations beyond that provided by...

Increasingly, firms are augmenting financial measures of performance with non-financial measures of performance with a view to instill a long-run focus and reduce managerial myopia. Thus, in this paper, we utilize an agency-theoretic model to examine closely how financial measures cause...

Franchising is an important form of organizational control. Possible benefits of franchising include its ability to reduce agency costs that increase with costly monitoring, and provide incentives for the use of local information by onsite managers. However, these benefits may come at a cost, as...

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

Almost 30 years after the introduction of the CIO position, the ideal CIO reporting structure (whether the CIO should report to the CEO or the CFO) is yet to be prescribed. There is an intuitive assumption among some proponents of IT that the CIO should always report to the CEO to promote the...

Earnings management research often uses discretionary accruals from Jones-type models. These models assume a linear relation between sales changes and accruals. However, we predict and find that sales changes have a non-linear asymmetric effect on accruals through managers' operating decisions....