In this paper, we propose technology uncertainty as a new factor relevant to market collusion. We analyze an infinitely repeated quantity game where, for each firm, the marginal productivity of the input employed in the production process is affected by an unobservable shock. Each firm faces...

We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quantites which decide whether exporting into each other market. The product is homogeneous and production entails constant returns to scale. Scope effects are present. By dealing with two types of trade costs, namely per unit and...

The seminal paper by Abreu (1986) is revisited to reassess the optimality of one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments. It is shown that there are admissible conditions under which the use of grim trigger strategies with an infinite Nash reversion is more efficient than implementing Abreu’s penal...

We compare two-stage Stackleberg with Cournot equilibrium under the assumption of quantity competition and homogeneous goods.  We show that, when the curvature of the inverse market demand equals the total number of firms in the industry, the outcome of the two games coincides.

Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will benegatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industryconcentration. Governments should tax industries with monopolistic powersoftly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle ofcorporate...

Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will be negatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industry concentration. Governments should tax industries with monopolistic power softly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle of corporate...