Field experiments occupy a middle ground between laboratory experiments and naturally occurring field data. The idea is to perform a controlled experiment that captures important characteristics of the real world. Relative to traditional empirical economics, field experiments provide an...

Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should...

Two systems of bus driver compensation exist in Santiago, Chile. Most drivers are paid per passenger transported, while a second system compensates other drivers with a fixed wage. Compared with fixed-wage drivers, per-passenger drivers have incentives to engage in "La Guerra por el Boleto"...

Yahoo! Research partnered with a nationwide retailer to study the effects of online display advertising on both online and in-store purchases. We use a randomized field experiment on 3 million Yahoo! users who are also past customers of the retailer. We find statistically significant evidence...

Online advertising offers unprecedented opportunities for measurement. A host of new metrics, clicks being the leading example, have become widespread in advertising science. New data and experimentation platforms open the door for firms and researchers to measure true causal effects of...

Bidders on eBay frequently engage in sniping: that is, submitting a bid seconds before an auction closes. Using a field experiment, we attempt to measure the size of the benefit of sniping (if any). To do this we selected pairs of auctions that were as identical as possible (same item, same...

We consider an auction in which the behavior of one potential bidder departs mildly from full rationality. We show that the presence of such an inexpert bidder can be enough to discourage all of an infinitely large population of fully rational potential bidders from entering an auction....

This paper presents an equilibrium explanation for the persistence of naive bidding. Specifically, we consider a common value auction in which a "naive" bidder (who ignores the Winner's Curse) competes against a fully rational bidder (who understands that her rival is not). We show that the...