This paper presents an experimental investigation of the three ambient-based mechanisms proposed by Segerson [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 87-98 (1988)] for controlling emissions from a group of nonpoint source polluters: a marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty, and a mechanism that...

In this paper we build on a voluntary mechanism introduced by Segerson and Wu (2006) that uses the threat of an ambient tax to induce nonpoint source polluters to reduce emissions. In addition to reviewing Segerson and Wu's policy, we propose a new voluntary/threat policy that offers some...

Recent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions...

Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting...

This study investigates the influence of social preferences on voting decisions using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is best thought of as a public goods voting extension of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism for private goods. In particular, this mechanism is used to...

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 90, Number 1, February 2008

In this working paper we demonstrate that some of the statistical tests used by Huang and Smith in a recent Land Economics article (74(2 1998): 186-202) were erroneous, and raise concerns about their corresponding conclusions. Specifically, using data from one of the studies that they showcase,...