The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values...

The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values...

We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization under risk neutrality. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of the traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. The issuer of...

We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. Under risk neutrality, the issuer of...

We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization under risk neutrality. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of the traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. The issuer of...

We employ a large scale macroeconometric model to study transitory adjustment problems and long term welfare effects of a Norwegian EU-membership. Compared to the present European Economic Area (EEA) treaty, accession would primarily require economic reforms in the fields of agriculture, public...