We consider 1927 borrowers from 54 countries who had a credit rating by both Moody's and S&P as of the end of 1998, and their subsequent default history up to the end of 2002. Viewing bond ratings as predicted probabilities of default, we show that it is unlikely that both agencies are well...

We consider 1927 borrowers from 54 countries who had a credit rating by both Moodys and S&P as of the end of 1998, and their subsequent default history up to the end of 2002. Viewing bond ratings as predicted probabilities of default, we show that it is unlikely that both agencies are well...

We consider 1927 borrowers from 54 countries who had a credit rating by both Moody s and S&P as of the end of 1998, and their subsequent default history up to the end of 2002. Viewing bond ratings as predicted probabilities of default, we show that it is unlikely that both agencies are well...

Bitcoin plunged by 30% on May 19, 2021. We examine the outage the largest crypto exchange Binance experienced during the crash, when it halted trading for retail clients and stopped providing transaction data. We find evidence that Binance back-filled these missing transactions with data that...

We investigate whether employees in Germany benefit from public bank guarantees in terms of employment probability and wages. To that end, we exploit the removal of public bank guarantees in Germany in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment. Our results show that bank guarantees lead to higher...

Risk-Yield Profile of the New Covered-Call-Index of the German Stock Exchange We have analysed in this article the risk-yield profile of the new DAXplus Covered-Call-Index of Deutsche Börse AG (German Stock Exchange) in the period from January 1993 to June 2005. It has turned out that, on a...

This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Bothself-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonableexplanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996and December 2006 show that...

This paper examines intraday stock price effects and trading activity caused by ad hoc disclosures in Germany. The evidence suggests that the observed stock prices react within 90 minutes after the ad hoc disclosures. Trading volumes take even longer to adjust. We find no evidence for abnormal...