When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the...

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the...

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the...

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the...

When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to exercise safety care requires public intervention. This control takes the form of both monetary incentives but also monitoring taking place either ex ante or ex post, i.e. before or after an accident...

When firms undertake activities which are environmentally risky, the divergence between social and private incentives to exert safety care requires public intervention. This control occurs both through ex ante regulation and ex post legal investigation. We delineate the respective scopes of...