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A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325818
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374424
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255632
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137333
We present a partial identification approach for ascending auctions wit bidder asymmetries, where bidders' asymmetric types may be unobservable to the econometrician. Our approach yields sharp bounds and builds on and generalizes other recent bounds approaches for correlated private values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995486
Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208692
We present a partial identification approach for ascending auctions wit bidder asymmetries, where bidders’ asymmetric types may be unobservable to the econometrician. Our approach yields sharp bounds and builds on and generalizes other recent bounds approaches for correlated private values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801447
Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765392
Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781612
Recently Talman and Yang (2008) examined an assignment market under price control. In the market a number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder has a valuation on each item. The seller has a reservation price for every item. Meanwhile every item has a ceiling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618321