We provide a theory for career choices of employees willing to become entrepreneurs and facing credit constraints. We show that they need a sufficient mix of reputation and financial capital. We consider their choice to work for transparent or opaque firms. Transparent firms disclose more...

We analyze the role of professional reputation in the transition to entrepreneurial activity when credit is rationed. We study an employee's willingness to allow the market to learn information about talent by choosing more or less informative projects. This choice impacts the employee's...

This paper investigates a negative externality of new business creation. When being perceived as a good manager is a necessary condition to establish a firm in the future, we show that a priori talented managers may indulge in undertaking risky projects now. Indeed, such a choice renders more...

In this paper, we analyze how credit rationing in the market for funds induces would-be entrepreneurs both to build or preserve a good reputation and to accumulate cash through the projects they realize. More specifically, we consider employees who have the perspective of establishing their own...

We analyze empirically the determinants of Eurozone Treasury bills yields. Market microstructure as well as macroeconomic variables are found to significantly impact yields. Secondary trading in a centralized transparent electronic limit order book enhances liquidity and thus reduce yields....

This paper explores the impact of the organizational structure of a firm on its financing capacity. Unitary-form and multidivisional-form companies differ according to the distribution of tasks among managers. Within multidivisional firms, strategic decisions are taken by corporate headquarters...

This paper shows that when being perceived as a good manager is a necessary condition to be promoted, a priori talented managers may undertake excessively risky projects. Indeed, such a choice renders more difficult the updating of beliefs process regarding their actual types. In turn, good...

This paper investigates a negative externality of new business creation. When being perceived as a good manager is a necessary condition to establish a firm in the future, we show that a priori talented managers may indulge in undertaking risky projects now. Indeed, such a choice renders more...

This paper investigates a negative externality of new business creation. When being perceived as a good manager is a necessary condition to establish a firm in the future, we show that a priori talented managers may indulge in undertaking risky projects now. Indeed, such a choice renders more...