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Social Insurance of Short Spell Sickness
Flåm, Sjur Didrik - In: Nordic Journal of Political Economy 30 (2004), pp. 79-90
This paper looks at social insurance of short term absence from work. The chief concern is with efficiency properties of full coverage. That arrangement is reviewed and criticized here in light of received theory. A main point is that positive loading of the premium implies less than full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435874
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Deductible or co-insurance: Which is the better insurance contract under adverse selection?
Breuer, Michael - 2004
optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a … positive co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and buy the optimal insurance … expected utility while deterring high risks from joining the contract that is designed for low risks. The deductible contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315526
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Determinants of consumer financial risktaking:Evidence from deductible choice
Gorter, Janko; Schilp, Paul - de Nederlandsche Bank - 2010
This paper examines the predictive power of weather for electricity prices in day ahead markets in real time. We find that next-day weather forecasts improve the forecast accuracy of Scandinavian day-ahead electricity prices substantially in terms of point forecasts, suggesting that weather...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475765
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Bounded rationality and socially optimal limits on choice in a self-selection model
Sheshinski, Eytan - 2003
When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011505924
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Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance : Longitudinal Evidence from France
Dionne, Georges - 2012
The identification of information problems in different markets is challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning within the context of a multi-period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring et...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115720
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Customers and Investors : A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions
Merton, Robert C. - 2016
Financial institutions have both investors and customers. Investors, such as those who invest in stocks and bonds or private/public-sector guarantors of institutions, expect an appropriate risk-adjusted return in exchange for the financing and risk-bearing that they provide. Customers of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004624
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Signalling and Default : Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John - 2003
In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128748
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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2003
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128751
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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2004
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070241
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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2004
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074211