We analyze a Cournot duopoly market with differentiated goods and the separation between ownership and control. We … substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …

I propose a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback …

We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos … (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is … prisoners dilemma, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium entailing both firms hiring managers. At equilibrium, the more …

between owners and managers who might have different incentives. To understand the degree to which misspecifying firms … maximization. Considering the US antitrust regime, the experiment sets up cartel fines for firms' managers as well as owners. I …) Managers are more likely to form cartels when managers' and owners' incentives are different compared to when their incentives …

profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases …

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

We derive Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly in which each firm hires a manager to undertake … Cournot game. Furthermore, Cournot and Bertrand models with overconfident managers in- duce low prices, massive productions …