Using a unique data set, we test whether households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences. Our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household-coverage specific...

We examine the impact of U.S. states' adoption of the partnership long-term care (LTC) insurance program on households' purchases of private coverage. Targeting middle-class households, this program increases the benefits of privately insuring via a higher asset threshold for Medicaid...

We examine whether bundling in telecommunications services reduces churn using a series of large, independent cross sections of household decisions. To identify the effect of bundling, we construct a pseudo-panel dataset and utilize a linear, dynamic panel-data model, supplemented by...

We examine if and how incumbent firms respond to entry and entry threats using non-price modes of competition. Our analysis focuses on airline service quality. We find that incumbent on-time performance (OTP) actually worsens in response to entry, and even entry threats, by Southwest Airlines....

Providers in many markets make promises about the performance (quality) of a service (product) that can only be assessed after purchase. Sellers face a tradeoff whenever they provide such a promise: A better promise (1) increases demand today, but (2) reduces the likelihood of achieving the...

We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to hospital market structure. As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives to coordinate or differentiate in their choice of vendors. We find evidence of...

Motivated by widely publicized concerns that there are quot;too manyquot; plans, we structurally estimate (and validate) an equilibrium model of the Medicare Part D market to study the welfare impacts of two feasible, similar-sized approaches for reducing choice. One reduces the maximum number...