We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …

dictatorship (q=1). -- Dynamic political economy ; voting ; public goods ; bargaining ; experiments …We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes …

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is … voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the … equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities. …

recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the … equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities. …

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of … decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding …

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of … decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding …