We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...

We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...

In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a...

Supplier development in the form of contract farming has become the main sourcing strategy in agro-processing industry. However, it is not yet clear from the extant literature how investments in contract farming contribute towards yield per yield. More specifically, this study sought to...

Despite the evolution of purchasing operations over many years, a comprehensive perspective is lacking in practice, leading to inefficiencies. This study aims to validate a model designed to guide how to balance the purchasing environment. It comprehensively delineates the general pattern (a...