We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin’s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo’s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nashimplementable social...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer...

This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n Ï 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR)...