We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity", and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices are easy. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if strategic choices can be based on first-order...

We examine the impact of party organisation construction of accounting firms on audit quality. We find that although there is no relationship between the party membership status of auditors and audit quality, the audit quality of party-member auditors significantly improves after accounting...

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices are easy. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if strategic choices can be based on...

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices...

We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a coarse data set can be coarsely rationalized by a linear order (or weak order). The conditions are easy to check, and efficient algorithms are provided. We apply our theory to investigate the observable restrictions of several...

We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. The auctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not have reliable information about the joint distribution. In this setting, we analyze the performance of...

We study a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, and independent and diffuse information. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists a deterministic mechanism that i) is Bayesian incentive compatible; ii) delivers...

We develop an extension of Luce's random choice model that incorporates a role for the association of alternatives. Each alternative is characterized by a salience value, a Luce value, and its associated alternatives. The salience value captures the alternative's ability to attract the decision...

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices are easy. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if strategic choices can be based on...