We study a model in which managers' disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to...

This paper develops a model of financing that jointly determines a firm's capital structure, its voluntary disclosure policy, and its cost of capital. Investors who receive securities in return for supplying capital sometimes incur losses when they trade their securities with an informed trader....

In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are "forthcoming" (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or "strategic" (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers...

This paper studies the joint effect of conservatism and aggregation on the cost of equity capital and the efficiency of debt contracts. In the model, a firm's two assets are valued at either the lower-of-cost-or-market or fair value and the accounting report aggregates the value of the two...

The corporate information environment develops endogenously as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. We provide a framework for analyzing the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in a capital...

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients,...

This study models the interaction between a sell-side analyst and risk-averse investors. It derives an analyst's optimal earnings forecast and investors' optimal trading decisions in a setting where the analyst's payoff depends on the trading volume the forecast generates as well as on the...

Most corporations dedicate significant time and attention to managing their shareholder base. Furthermore, companies overwhelmingly prefer “long-term shareholders” to “short-term shareholders.” There is little rigorous research, however, that conclusively demonstrates the impact that...

When valuing a firm, investors must assess not only its expected future cash flows but also the systematic risk inherent in these cash flows. In this paper, we model the process by which investors may learn about firms' betas from earnings and how this learning process affects the relationship...

The paper studies a manager's optimal earnings forecasting strategy and optimal earnings management policy in a setting where both the mean and the variance of the distribution generating the firm's cash flows are unknown. The paper shows that the equilibrium price of the firm is a function of...