damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses … between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members …, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production …

damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications. …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications. …