We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially...

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between participants, including the residency matches between doctors and hospitals. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews in the National Resident Matching Program were switched to a virtual format, which resulted in a dramatic and...

When groups of schools within a single district run their admission processes independently of one another, the resulting match is often inefficient: many children are left unmatched and seats are left unfilled. We study the problem of re-matching students to take advantage of these empty seats...

I study a model where people can be matched in fractions. That is to say, whether a pair is matched is not a binary matter. They can be matched with some intensity. Each has a fixed availability: the total intensity with which he is matched to his partners. I propose a notion of competitive...