This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there … three types of solvable priority structures: The strict type, the house allocation with existing tenants (HET) type, where …

satisfy RGSP, but is only necessary for the Top Trading Cycles rule. For the allocation of divisible private goods among …

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …

The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, pub- lic housing, dormitory rooms, and … our construction to show what can and what cannot be achieved in a variety of allocation and exchange problems, and we …