aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …

between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …

Do experts adjust their policy recommendations when the facts change? We conduct a large-scale randomized experiment … among 1,224 economic experts across 109 countries that includes two treatments. The first treatment is the geographic and … randomly assigned information treatment that informs experts about the past macroeconomic performance of their country. We find …

mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the …