We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and a limited number of firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the view point of each...

We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms competein prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformedmarket. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the good than a fixed amount (say...

We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms compete in prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformed market. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the good than a fixed amount...

We characterize the equilibrium of a game in vertically differentiated market which exhibits network externalities. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Compatibility means in our model that the inherent qualities of the goods are close enough. By choosing its quality, the...

We suggest a model derived from the well-known Mussa and Rosen's model, in which two populations of consumers of opposite tastes co-exist: they rank in exactly the reverse order variants sold at the same price. This model may account for linked and contradictory characteristics in products (as...

We characterize the equilibrium of a game in vertically differentiated market which exhibits network externalities. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Compatibility means in our model that the inherent qualities of the goods are close enough. By choosing its quality, the...

This paper suggests a modelling of the labelling procedure consistent with empirical observations, that allows the endogenous calculation of labelling criteria. The authority in charge of the labelling program chooses the level of labelling criteria so as to maximise the social surplus,...

Under the Cross-Licensing system (CL), firms are allowed to trade non cooperatively the results of R&D efforts, and compete in the innovation and production stages. First, the paper proposes a simple modeling of this system. Second, a relevant comparison is made with the Cartelized Research...

We suggest a model derived from the well-known Mussa and Rosen's model, in which two populations of consumers of opposite tastes co-exist: they rank in exactly the reverse order variants sold at the same price. This model may account for linked and contradictory characteristics in products (as...

We characterize the equilibrium of a game in vertically differentiated market which exhibits network externalities. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Compatibility means in our model that the inherent qualities of the goods are close enough. By choosing its quality, the...