In this study we construct, for the first time in Israel, an index for ranking the quality of corporate governance of Israeli firms. The index, based mainly on principles that are common in existing international indices, focuses on four main topics (the abilities of the board of directors,...

We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling...

We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling...

We examine 54 large transactions in Israel - a concentrated ownership economy, and estimate the private benefits of control implied in the block price via an elaborated Barclay and Holderness (1989) methodology. Cross-sectional regressions indicate that private benefits, as a proportion of...

In a sample of 124 publicly traded Israeli firms in 1994-2001 we find that CEOs who belong to the family or business group that owns most of the firm shares ("owner CEOs") receive significantly (about 50%) higher pay that professional CEOs who do not belong to the control group ("non-owner...

We study 84 dual class stock uni. cations, where superior vote shareholders gave up their superior voting status (all firm stocks became quot;one share one votequot;) and received (in most cases) compensation in the form of additional shares. Unifications are essentially intra-firm transactions...

We study how minimum trading unit changes on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange impact stock trading activity, price volatility and value. The value effects are consistent with Merton (1987)'s model, that is an increase in the investor base (trading volume) and a decrease in price noisiness affect...

We collect data on CEO pay in 122 closely-held firms traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange during 1995-2001. After estimating CEO pay performance sensitivity and CEO excess pay, we examine how these two pay attributes affect end of period (year 2001) Tobin's Q. Our main findings and conclusions...

We hypothesize that in a country with lax corporate governance rules Tobin's Q is maximized when controlholders' vote approaches the supermajority level. In this holding range controlholders do not possess extreme power (cannot pass supermajority decisions), nor do they feel a strong temptation...