We examine a model of suppliers selling to two segments of consumers, who have different preferences for quality (or some product characteristic). We show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments, then there is less investment in quality. We find that both consumer...

The economics literature generally considers products as points in some characteristics space. Starting with Hotelling, this served as a convenient assumption, yet with more products being .exible or self-customizable to some degree it makes sense to think that products have positive measure. I...

This work models outsourcing under oligopolistic competition with nonlinear costs. I show that in a covered market, if each firm's marginal cost before outsourcing is lower than the industry's average cost, outsourcing leads to increased prices and decreased consumer welfare. Joint outsourcing...

I model manufacturers competing through a retailer. I model two types of advertising that each firm can engage in: advertising that increases product differentiation and advertising that increases (possibly perceived) value of the product. While the two types of advertising result in...

We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...